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ABSTRACT 
In this paper interactions between finance, development and armed conflict are explored to 
demonstrate that financial factors are crucial in sustaining conflict-underdevelopment 
feedback loops. Military expenditure drains resources, financial instability leads to conflict 
(and vice versa), war retards the development of financial institutions/infrastructure, and 
interactions between finance and conflict are exacerbated by distributional struggles. Some of 
these feedback effects are captured within a two-stage model of war, finance and 
development and this is used as the basis for an empirical analysis.  Econometrically, the 
model is estimated using panel estimation and two stage Probit least squares (2SPLS) binary 
dependent variable estimation techniques to control for simultaneity and heterogeneity. The 
results suggest that financial constraints and financial instability increase the chances of civil 
war directly and, via negative impacts on development, indirectly too.   
Key Words: Human development, civil conflict, military spending, financial instability, 
financial infrastructure 
JEL Classifications: O15, O16, O43, H56  
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Civil War and Human Development:  
Impacts of Finance and Financial Infrastructure  
1 Introduction 
The feedback effects between poverty, underdevelopment and conflict are widely analysed 
(see Blattman and Miguel 2010, Goodhand 2003, Nafziger and Auvinen 2002 etc.) and the 
impacts of finance and financial stability on growth and development are also widely known 
(e.g. see Dornbusch and Reynoso 1989, Beck et al. 2004, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine 2009). 
Civil conflict has far-reaching effects on underdeveloped countries, potentially destroying 
institutions and infrastructure, thereby exacerbating stagnation and underdevelopment. The 
impacts of armed conflict are particularly detrimental for the poorest nations because they are 
prone to civil conflicts for which domestic socio-political issues are crucial catalysts 
(Addison et al. 2001). Although it has been argued that conflict is not without positive 
impacts if it allows the accumulation of social capital (see Voors et al. 2010), armed conflict 
destroys scarce but essential institutions within poor countries, including financial 
institutions; it incurs indirect human and long-term development costs including the loss of 
entitlements, particularly amongst vulnerable groups (Stewart and Fitzgerald, 2000). Conflict 
also generates distributional changes, intensifying horizontal inequality across different 
ethnic/religious/tribal groups and vertical inequality down through different income groups 
(Stewart and Fitzgerald, 2000).  
As the interactions between conflict and poverty, and between poverty and finance, have 
already been thoroughly explored elsewhere, this paper focuses specifically on the role 
played by financial factors in the poverty-conflict loop. Looking at both sides of the finance-
conflict loop, just as war creates financial problems so too financial problems can increase 
the propensity for civil conflicts. Addison et al. (2001) argue that armed conflict, including 
its financing, exacerbates economic, political and social problems generating links between 
conflict, finance and dualistic development. Whilst narrow development is not the only cause 
of conflict and conflict is not the only cause of narrow development, financial instability 
creates social problems and these are a catalyst to further conflict.  
This paper develops these ideas by constructing a theoretical and empirical framework in 
which the complex feedbacks between conflict, development and finance are analysed to test 
the hypotheses that financial factors precipitate conflict not only directly but also indirectly; 
underdevelopment and financial instability together increase vulnerability to ongoing conflict 
and financial factors play a crucial role in sustaining the feedback loops between conflict and 
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underdevelopment. The need to finance conflict has a direct impact on poverty by diverting 
government expenditure towards military goals, putting pressure not only on government 
balances but also on financial markets generally, exacerbating financial instability. Financial 
instability also contributes to general uncertainty, limiting development and directly 
incubating conditions for civil conflict. Indirectly, financial factors precipitate war because 
limited availability of finance and rudimentary financial institutions mean that vicious circles 
of conflict and underdevelopment persist; and ongoing socioeconomic instability contributes 
to ongoing civil unrest.  
Given the complexity of the feedback effects between finance, poverty and conflict, the 
issues are examined from a number of perspectives: the direct and indirect impacts of 
financial factors on conflict and vice versa are explored in Section 2, addressing the insight 
that financial factors affect conflict directly (e.g. financial instability fosters conflict) and 
indirectly because financial constraints limit potential for development and therefore 
indirectly precipitate conflict (e.g. reflecting distributional struggles). In section 3, a model is 
developed in which limited opportunities create pressures for insurgency and this approach is 
used to identify the interactions between conflict, development and finance. In Section 4, 
results are presented from the analysis of a conflict-finance-development feedback model 
estimated using a combination of panel estimation techniques, whilst controlling for 
simultaneity and endogeneity in limited dependent variable estimation using a 2 Stage Probit 
Least Squares (2SPLS) methodology following Maddala (1983) and Keshk (2003). The 
conclusions and policy implications are presented in Section 5. 
2 Conflict, Finance and Development 
War and conflict generate financial strains for a number of reasons. Nagarajan (1998) argues 
that conflict affects the financial sectors of developing countries at many levels: at the 
macroeconomic level by disrupting general economic confidence; at the „meso‟ level by 
destroying key financial institutions; and at the microeconomic level by disrupting the social 
relationships essential to financial transactions in developing economies. Any conflict can 
lead to financial instability but it is particularly problematic for poorer countries where 
financial infrastructure is not well developed. 
2.1 War finance: military expenditure consumes scarce financial resources 
Conflict generates financial strains particularly if it is associated with an increase in military 
expenditure and arms imports. During civil wars, unsurprisingly, the ratio of military 
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expenditure to GDP rises sharply and government revenues tend to be low; for example 
following the conflict in Mozambique, fiscal deficits were between 10-20% of GDP. Fiscal 
pressures from high levels of military spending devoted primarily to destruction of opponents 
and their resources coincide with low levels of spending on social and economic 
infrastructure. Military spending on arms imports will also have implications because the 
drain on foreign exchange reserves will mean that less foreign exchange is available to fund 
the imports needed for investment and infrastructure projects. Also, maintaining high levels 
of military expenditure will not only divert expenditure away from social and infrastructure 
expenditure but also will contribute to the destruction of infrastructure already in place, 
exacerbating stagnation, fuelling further civil unrest and ongoing conflict.  
 Natural resources will play a crucial role especially when internal sources of war 
finance are limited. Whilst it might be that conflicts are precipitated by attempts to gain 
control over natural resources, there is also evidence that the causality goes the other way i.e. 
dependence on natural resources increases when conflict is endemic (Brunnschweiler and 
Bulte 2009). Commercial borrowing to fund military expenditure is often based on 
mortgaging of future returns from resource wealth, tapping into influential international 
private interests; for example, the Angolan war was funded on the basis of oil reserves and 
diamonds, which led to 95% of Angola‟s oil share being used in debt servicing of loans to 
finance arms and mercenaries. Similar patterns were observed in Somalia and Zaire. In this 
way, government expenditures were deflected away from social uses, promoting dualism and 
narrow development rather than broad based development, fostering further conflict.  
A key question is why are military expenditures particularly large in poorer countries? 
Political institutions can play an important role and the proportion of military expenditure to 
GDP tends to be lower in democracies (Collier and Hoeffler 2004).  Collier (2006) argues 
that a range of strategic and economic interests are important and military expenditures will 
have different impacts during peacetime and during wartime. The real issue is not the scale of 
military expenditure or the power of the military institution but the activities that are being 
funded. The impacts of military institutions engaged in peaceful activities versus those 
involved in armed conflict will differ according to the level of development of a country and 
according to social and institutional factors. If military expenditure is used to fund a well-
organised and productive institution, then it can have positive impacts in countries with 
otherwise underdeveloped institutions, at least in peacetime. It may promote economic 
growth by boosting aggregate demand; it can be a crucial catalyst to development if it is used 
to build essential infrastructure and develop human skills; the military can play a role in 
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education, building roads/hospitals and other forms of infrastructure – with broadly based 
socio-economic benefits – all of which boost growth and development (Benoit 1972, 1978). 
Feedback effects may operate if growth reduces risk of further conflicts by raising levels of 
income (Collier 2008, Collier and Hoeffler 2006, 2004, 2002). The extent of benefit will 
depend on the severity of security threats because military expenditures may have positive 
output effects when threats are high but negative output effects when threats are low (Dunne, 
Smith and Willenbockel 2005). Also, negative associations between military expenditure and 
growth can persist during peacetimes (Knight, Loayza and Villaneuva 1996, Collier and 
Hoeffler 2006). In post-conflict phases, Addison et al (2001) also argue that military 
expenditures may be high, not only because of demobilisation costs but also as a deterrent to 
further rebel activity.  
Strategic issues affect military expenditure and the availability of external and internal 
finance determines length and outcome of wars and conflicts (Addison et al., 2001).  Collier 
and Hoeffler (2006) argue that dynamic inconsistency effects, operating at both a micro and a 
macro level, generate interactions between military spending and repeated conflict / fragile 
peacetimes.
2
 They argue that military expenditure can be used as a signal by governments or 
a screen by insurgents to indicate a commitment to peace agreements: low levels of post-
conflict spending signal intentions to honour peace agreements and high levels of post-
conflict spending signal intentions to renege. Governments have incentives to renege on 
peace agreements because the military capability and therefore bargaining power of rebel 
groups decays during peacetime. Resultant incentives to renege by the incumbent 
government i.e. diversion of finance away from government expenditures to help broadly 
based development, can contribute to the fragility of peace settlements (Collier and Hoeffler, 
2006, p. 6). There are also incentives not to renege, for example the fear of losing access to 
foreign aid. So a separating equilibrium emerges: on one hand, peace-loving governments 
honour peace agreements, signalling this intention by lowering military expenditure, reducing 
the probability of further conflict; on the other hand, governments which plan to pursue a 
reneging strategy will maintain military spending at a high level in the immediate post-
conflict stage and, because this signals a government‟s intention to renege, this will increase 
the probability of further conflict.  The selection of strategies is determined by the relative 
                                                 
2
 This type of game will not necessarily take place in a world of rational agents. Collier and Hoeffler (2006) cite 
Hirschleifer (2001), who notes the problem of different and imperfect perceptions of military success with a 
tendency for over-optimism in perception of military prospects. 
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benefits and costs of reversion to conflict and high levels of military spending are associated 
with increased risk of renewed conflict (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). 
2.2 War exacerbates financial instability and uncertainty 
The interactions between armed conflict and financial instability are complex. 
Empirical evidence from Magnusson and Wydick (2001) compares the efficiency of markets 
in 8 largest African stock markets in comparison with emerging stock markets in South East 
Asia and Latin America; their results suggest that emerging African markets are no less 
efficient than other emerging markets even though generally these countries are more conflict 
ridden. Assessing the empirical evidence on the comparative efficiency of international stock 
markets is problematic however, because a complex range of factors will be affecting stock 
market performance. The pessimism and uncertainty that emerge in times of conflict will 
contribute to financial instability because it generates socio-political uncertainty which 
impacts on the confidence of entrepreneurs and investors, particularly if the collapse of 
financial markets destroys paper value generating the appearance of a widespread loss in 
accumulated capital (Keynes 1914). 
Fiscal pressures contribute to financial instability though the relationships are 
complex; financial instability impacts on war not only directly but indirectly too. War may 
contribute to financial instability if monetary and financial policies are unsustainable. On the 
other hand, in the face of financial instability, anti-inflationary macro stabilisation policies 
may exacerbate ongoing poverty and unemployment as debts and deficits are reduced in the 
process; tight monetary and fiscal policies will have a disproportionate adverse impact on the 
poor because less will be spent on employment generation and development projects. Policy 
tradeoffs emerge between expansionary policies to promote employment and contractionary 
policies to control instability generated by inflation and capital flight. These trade-offs are not 
always well managed, e.g. IMF conditionality packages can worsen civil conflicts in the 
short-run as was seen in Greece in May 2010. In the longer term, contractionary government 
policies may lead to rising structural unemployment, again exacerbating civil unrest. These 
factors together with general uncertainty generate some of the pre-conditions for conflict.  
The import of arms to enable the protection of the vested interests of governing 
groups may create external financing pressures with further implications for financial 
stability and the exchange rate. The development of national and sub-national currencies is 
crucial because currencies provide a means of raising revenue via seigniorage (e.g. in Eritrea) 
but the printing of money may fuel hyperinflation and uncertainty (e.g. Mugabe‟s regime in 
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Zimbabwe). War financing instruments may be used at unofficial level with rebel groups 
running financial systems and informal currencies in occupied areas, sometimes instigated 
under duress (Addison et al. 2001, Collier 2008). If corruption and cronyism limit the 
sustainability of underdeveloped financial systems then banking crises can generate massive 
uncertainty plus economic and financial shocks. Resolving these financial shocks in conflict 
prone countries can involve large fiscal costs, taking money away from reconstruction and 
destabilising already fragile societies and economies. 
 The negative impacts of war on business confidence and pessimism and uncertainty 
will be magnified within a highly liquid financial sector. Collier and Gunning (1995) explore 
the interactions between conflict and propensities to hold money in describing the process by 
which investors save profits in liquid form during wars, switching them to fixed investment 
projects in peace-time. These forces will complicate monetary policy; it is difficult to target 
money supply given shifting and unstable money demand. Also, war may necessitate the sale 
of real assets to finance a war effort because government liabilities become difficult if not 
impossible to sell given erratic demand (Collier and Gunning, 1995). Rises in the cost of 
finance may be exacerbated if higher risk premia affect countries‟ credit ratings, contributing 
to ongoing financial problems. As growth is slowed by financial uncertainty and employment 
dwindles, the economic opportunities available for the poor will also shrink, contributing to 
persistent poverty and inequality and generating socio-economic instability and the potential 
for ongoing civilian unrest. Globalisation may exacerbate these pressures if it facilitates 
capital flows. Also, financial instability will not necessarily be moderated by government 
intervention because regulatory capture is common in poor, war-prone nations; with the 
exception of Korea, state control of financial systems in conflict-prone countries has been 
poor (Addison et al, 2001).  The democratic institutions needed to protect impartial financial 
regulation are limited, particularly in the poorest, most conflict-prone countries and this may 
feed into the conflict-finance-poverty nexus. 
2.3 Conflict and distributional struggles 
Financial constraints limit economic opportunities amongst poorer groups 
precipitating distributional struggles over financial resources, including foreign exchange and 
natural resources such as gold, diamonds and oil. It is particularly common in 
underdeveloped countries because growth is stagnant, levels of income are low and natural 
resources such as diamonds, oil and drug crops provide one of the few economic 
opportunities available to impoverished groups. Civil conflict is therefore as much about 
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alternative opportunities given poverty and stagnant growth as it is about political 
motivations for rebellious action (Collier and Hoeffler 2004, Collier 2008).   
Poverty and discrimination emerge in dual economies as governing groups seek to 
protect their economic and/or socio-political interests using violent techniques (Grossman 
1999, Hirschleifer 2001, Collier and Hoeffler 2004). Recurrent insurrections are often the 
product of the nexus between financial control by elites and oppression (Addison et al, 2001). 
Overall, the poor are excluded from ordinary economic opportunities as they cannot control 
financial systems and their recourse is conflict. Finance plays a crucial role in this: vicious 
cycles become entrenched because financial problems lead to underdevelopment and 
stagnation, exacerbating social and economic unrest thus increasing the probability of future 
conflicts. War destroys factors of production (Collier 1999) and temporarily diminishes the 
usefulness of natural resources and accumulated capital, affecting poorer groups 
disproportionately because it generates income losses, absorbs savings and depletes 
consumption. As a consequence, the relative values of capital goods, money and consumable 
goods will shift during war-time.
3
  There will be a shift towards consumption reflecting the 
urgency of needs for present goods to reduce distress and poverty in the present and near 
future, eroding the value of capital goods and raising discount rates, reflecting shifts in 
people‟s inter-temporal preferences towards the short-term: “Not even the Prussian army can 
eat rails and embankments or clothe itself in bricks and mortar” (Keynes 1914, p. 486).4 
Increased demand for finance and foreign exchange to fund military expenditure will feed 
through into higher interest rates, dampening investment activity and slowing economic 
growth (Voors et al. 2010). According to Keynes (1914) all this does not necessarily mean 
“we are ruined for life” but wars do lead to changes in the distribution of income and wealth.  
 War financing fuels corruption and military spending for personal gain is often 
financed by sale of public assets (Collier and Gunning, 1995). In dualistic economies, elites 
often control financial systems and state banking may evolve to finance private accumulation, 
particularly in agrarian economies, and this exacerbates economic inequality and 
discrimination. Financial systems may be used by elite groups to leverage existing wealth – 
e.g. in the coffee economies of Central America. In Indonesia, the 1997 financial crisis 
emerged in the context of widespread crony capitalism as elite groups sought to protect their 
own political interests in the face of financial instability, sparking widespread violence 
                                                 
3
 See Keynes (1940) and Fitzgerald (1997) for further detail on Keynes‟s analyses of the economic implications 
of war.  
4
 See also Voors et al. (2010) for experimental evidence about war raising discount rates . 
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against ethnic Chinese and exacerbating regional conflicts (Addison et al., 2001). Overall 
these distributional struggles have fostered the growth of insurgency as poverty and financial 
constraints have tipped excluded people over the edge into rebellion.  
Addison et al. (2001) argue that financial reforms are less likely to be effective in 
undemocratic systems. One reason will be the presence of political bias; when political 
systems move away from pure democracy then mutually acceptable transfer payments 
between different groups cannot remove the threat of war, particularly as such agreements 
will be unenforceable (Jackson and Morelli 2007). Similarly, Garfinkel (1994) argues that the 
political competition that characterises democracies introduces a negative bias into nations‟ 
military spending patterns and, given a strategic approach to military policy, this reduces 
other nations‟ incentives to arm as well. Thus Garfinkel argues that democratic institutions 
are a pre-commitment mechanism reducing the severity of conflicts and releasing resources 
for consumption. 
2.4 War retards the evolution of financial institutions and infrastructure 
Financial institutions and infrastructure are crucial to development; if savings cannot 
be channelled to those planning to invest then growth and development will slow (Dornbusch 
and Reynoso 1989). At a macro level and historically, wars have sometimes been periods of 
financial innovation because the need for war finance may introduce institutional changes as 
states increase control over banking to generate funds for war efforts (Kindleberger, 1993). 
There may be compulsory purchases of government debt and nationalization of financial 
institutions, creating periods of financial innovation, e.g. in Angola and Croatia (Addison et 
al., 2001). Conversely, macro stabilisation policies may exacerbate ongoing poverty if they 
involve distortions to financial infrastructure, limiting financial depth and intermediation and 
reducing opportunities for legitimate economic activity.  
 In the face of deficient domestic financial infrastructure, financial deregulation and 
globalisation have enabled the financing of armed conflict because the removal of capital 
controls and the reduction in the financial information required about borrowers has enabled 
easier and quicker transfer of money to fund armed conflict (Fitzgerald, 2003, p. 3).
5
  
Technological innovations have overcome some of the problems with otherwise deficient 
infrastructure in poor countries. Addison et al. (2001) argue that, in funding wars, external 
capital inflows from legitimate diasporas (e.g. payroll tax paid by Kosofvar Albanians 
                                                 
5
 Also see Fitzgerald (2003) for a discussion of global financial information about conflict funding and the 
problems and solutions associated with and international regulation of conflict funding, particularly in the 
context of the funding of self-determination movements. 
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working in Germany, also transfers to Tamil Tigers during Sri Lankan conflicts and in 
Eritrea) are crucial but moving money internationally requires knowledge and, sometimes 
illegal, technical assistance (e.g. from organised crime). Computerisation has facilitated the 
transfer of financial innovations, and globalisation has facilitated war financing even in the 
poorest countries, though with financial liberalisation on an international scale, it is harder to 
track financial flows. 
 Government rent-seeking activities will also distort financial infrastructure, for 
example the Bank of Cambodia encouraged the development of many banks in order to 
gather the fees and fines associated with the licensing of a bank (Addison et al, 2001). 
Systems are designed not to increase access to financial infrastructure but to circumvent 
exchange controls on international transfers – e.g. Hawala systems in South Asia (Addison et 
al, 2001, p. 3). Controls on financial systems, such as ceilings on interest rates (for example, 
in Angola and Mozambique) operate to favour certain groups. Powerful politicians often own 
the private banks - for example in Liberia, Charles Taylor owned the Bong Bank. Bank credit 
may be directed towards enterprises run by political elites generating an increased risk of bad 
loans. Privately owned banks may be involved in criminal activity, e.g. in Cambodia only 12 
of 33 private banks were legitimate; all others were involved in criminal activities.  These 
financial distortions destroy savings, lower living standards and spark conflict; for example, 
during the 1997 collapse of Albanian pyramid schemes; the central bank was unable to act 
given the political connections of pyramid bankers; as deposits slowed, the banks could not 
meet their commitments and the resultant banking collapse sent the country into a downward 
spiral of poverty and conflict (Jarvis, 1999).  
At a micro level, war and conflict destabilise the evolution of fragile and embryonic 
financial structures, exacerbating financial instability in poorer countries (Nagarajan 1998). 
Conflict has a negative impact because, as Collier and Gunning (1995) observes: „conflicts 
weaken or incapacitate institutions and encourage opportunistic behaviour‟. Limited financial 
depth and intermediation, associated with rudimentary or absent financial institutions, will 
limit economic opportunities e.g. for entrepreneurship, making insurgency a relatively 
tempting alternative. Weak financial regulation in underdeveloped economics promotes 
wealth accumulation via fraud, generating institutional constraints on the availability of 
financial infrastructure to ordinary people. As a consequence, the depth of financial 
intermediation is limited in poor, conflict-prone countries and so access to finance 
entrepreneurship and/or short-term consumption needs are limited. When the microlevel 
financial infrastructure is distorted, financial depth and financial intermediation will be 
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limited and so the poor will not have access to finance for small-scale agricultural 
investment, the development of small businesses and/or to provide short-term finance when 
crops fail. In agricultural communities, the absence of alternative economic opportunities will 
fuel dissatisfaction and for some insurgency will be the alternative.  
3. A model of conflict, finance and development 
Building upon the ideas outlined above, in this section a theoretical model is constructed 
which focuses on the role played by financial factors in feedback effects between conflict and 
under-development. As explored in the preceding section, finance plays its role not only 
directly but also indirectly: financial factors have a direct impact in inflaming conflicts, e.g. 
by draining government expenditure, generating financial instability and uncertainty. 
Financial factors also have an indirect impact on propensity for conflict by limiting legitimate 
economic opportunities, exacerbating poverty and socio-economic unrest, incubating future 
conflicts. These feedbacks can be analysed building upon the insights from Collier and 
Hoeffler (2004) and Collier et al. (2009) amongst others, who argue that civil conflict is as 
much about opportunities as it is about political motivations, particularly in very 
underdeveloped economies with large illiterate populations. Rebellion is not necessarily 
about political activism in the face of legitimate socio-economic grievances. Feasibility of 
insurgency is a key factor because rebellions can only occur given certain pre-conditions 
(Collier et al. 2009).  
This approach can be captured using a model capturing pressures for insurgency and 
tipping points for conflict. Assuming that civil conflicts emerge from a dispute between an 
incumbent government and an insurgent group(s), a number of factors will affect each side‟s 
propensity to fight. Incumbent governments with greater tendencies to fight dissent using 
military means will have proportionately higher military expenditures; military action will 
only be successful if governments can build strong armies (Acemoglu et al. 2009). Also, 
higher military expenditures can indicate governments‟ commitments to fight rebellions; 
over-sized armies are a signal that governments will meet opposition with force.  
On the other side, insurgency will be more likely when there is uncertainty and financial 
instability as these will feed through into socio-political uncertainty. The effectiveness of 
insurgent groups will be determined by the number of people they can recruit and the supply 
of new recruits will be higher at lower levels of development and/or at higher rates of 
population growth. If a country is relatively underdeveloped then there may be limited 
legitimate opportunities for earning money and if population pressures are high then 
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insurgent groups will have the critical mass need to provoke a conflict.  Financial variables 
will be important because recruits to insurgent groups will be seeking economic and financial 
rewards e.g. from the sale of diamonds, oil, drugs etc. (Collier 2008). Overall, as rebel action 
can bring financial as well as political rewards, there will be more new recruits willing to join 
insurgent groups if populations are growing, alternative economic opportunities are limited 
and/or access to finance is limited in the civilian economy.  
Together, these interactions between the incentives facing insurgent groups determine 
the states of war and development, with the probability of war expressed as a non-linear 
function: 
*])[|1Pr( wwW   (1) 
where *][|1 wwW  is an indicator function taking the value 1 if w>w* and 0 otherwise, 
and w is a latent variable capturing propensity for conflict and reflecting the composite 
influences of financial resources and development.  Overall, this propensity to conflict will be 
determined linearly as follows: 
digfstabw M 43210   (2)   
01 , 02 , 03  and 04  
where fstab is some macro measure of financial stability; Mg  is military expenditure, acting 
as a proxy for government aggression as explained above; i – is the interest rate (also 
capturing financial instability because higher interest rates are associated with larger risk 
premia); d is the level of development and  is a random error term.  
Financial factors, including the allocation of government expenditure, will also have 
indirect impacts on the propensity to conflict via their impacts of economic development. 
Overall government expenditure will be allocated as follows: 
1MST ggg    (3) 
sg  is the proportion of government spending on public non-military projects. Assuming 
underdeveloped financial institutions, government expenditure will be a key source of 
funding for most development infrastructure projects and so higher military expenditure will 
mean less social expenditure. With less public sector money available to fund projects that 
will improve human capital accumulation (viz. health and education spending) the potential 
for development will be eroded and human development will slow. Also, conflict will destroy 
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institutions and infrastructure thereby slowing development. Overall the level of development 
(d) will be determined as follows:  
jjs zfpopKigWd 6543210   (4) 
01 , 02 , 03 , 04 , 05  and 06  
where W is a binary variable capturing the state of conflict (as explained above), i is the 
interest rate and, in terms of development, is a simple measure of opportunity cost of 
consumption and investment in capital assets. K captures capital accumulation and, 
according to growth theory, this balanced against population growth ( pop), will be a key 
determinant of economic growth; assuming that the benefits from economic growth trickle 
down, if K is large (relative to pop) then it will foster more broadly based development 
too. Financial infrastructure (f) will affect development because financing constraints, e.g. 
limited availability of banking services, will limit economic opportunities for ordinary 
people. Finally, zj is a vector of other variables affecting development (which might include 
geographical features, degree of economic diversification, fractionalisation, income growth, 
size of the economy, infrastructure and institutional variables) and  is a random error term. 
4 Results and Discussion 
Previous empirical studies have explored some of the relationships between risk of war 
and socio-economic variables, identifying a positive relationship between military 
expenditure and the risk of civil war, though some evidence suggests that this association is 
spurious (e.g. Djankov and Reynal-Querol 2008). Collier and Hoeffler (1998) find that initial 
income and population size, ethno-linguistic fractionalisation and natural resource wealth are 
significant determinants of the severity and duration of civil wars. In later studies, using data 
for 55 civil wars from 1960-99, they estimate the risk of reversion to conflict and find that 
growth, political/social/ethnic factors, primary resource abundance, external threat, years of 
peace, population and geographic dispersion and military expenditure affect the probability 
of conflict (Collier and Hoeffler 2004, 2006; Collier et al. 2009). Whilst these (and other) 
previous analyses identify a role for many socioeconomic factors, more evidence is needed 
about the impact of financial factors on conflict and development and, using the framework 
outlined above, equations (1), (2) and (4) are estimated using the variables outlined above. 
The data codes and definitions used to capture the variables outlined above are explained in 
Appendix 1.  
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Some specific points about the variables used to estimate Equations (1), (2) and (4): the 
state of conflict is given by the variable W which equals 1 when there were 25 or more war 
deaths from internal conflicts in a given year and 0 otherwise; development is measured 
using the human development index (HDI); the lending rate is used as the interest rate 
because it is available for a wide selection of countries, central bank assets as a % of GDP 
(CBA) is used as a proxy for fstab assuming that financial systems are more stable when the 
central bank has more reserves including foreign exchange reserves. The remaining variables 
are self-explanatory.  
The data coverage was sometimes patchy and for this reason, two types of models were 
estimated: first, a “macro” model using data available on all variables except financial 
infrastructure – this was possible for a relatively large number of countries and years (i.e. 44 
countries over the period 1995-2007); but because financial infrastructure variables are likely 
to be crucial to development a second set of “micro” models was estimated for a smaller 
number of countries and years (i.e. 31 countries over the period 2004-2007) but with richer 
financial infrastructure variables. Financial infrastructure captured in 4 ways: number of 
commercial bank borrowers; number of commercial bank depositors; number of automatic 
teller machines and number of bank branches. Data limitations preclude a regional analysis to 
capture heterogeneity at a more disaggregated level and it is important to note that national 
patterns may obscure many inter-regional differences. 
Models were estimated using STATA 10 and panel estimation techniques were 
employed throughout to control for heterogeneity bias across the samples. The models were 
estimated in two stages: First, the dependent variables HDI and W were estimated 
independently using random effects panel single equation techniques (see Tables 1 and 3). 
Second, a simultaneous equation modelling strategy was employed using a Two Stage Probit 
Least Squares (2SPLS) techniques adopting Stata command CDSIMEQ to control for 
simultaneity between a continuous and a binary dependent variable, a method which 
incorporates instrumental variable estimation with corrected standard errors (following 
Maddala 1983 and Keshk 2003).  The results for the independent and simultaneous 
estimations of the “macrofinancial” model (which excludes financial infrastructure) are 
outlined in Tables 1 and 2. 
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TABLE 1: MACROFINANCIAL MODEL (LARGE SAMPLE) 
N= 572 (44 countries, 1995-2007)  
 
1a  Random effects probit estimation  
Dependent variable: Civil conflict (Y=1, N=0) 
Parameter 
   Estimate z score p value 
HDI  -4.919 -2.250 0.025** 
CBA  -4.399 -1.380 0.166  
LR  0.003 0.460 0.648  
MILEX  0.326 3.210 0.001***  
Constant  0.190 0.120 0.907  
 
Wald χ2(4) = 18.12 [p=0.001]   
 
1b  Random effects GLS estimation 
Dependent variable: HDI   
 Parameter         
 estimate t test p value 
W -0.001 -0.140 0.885 
SOCEXP 0.008 6.630 0.000*** 
GKF 0.001 5.820 0.000*** 
POPG -0.006 -3.310 0.001*** 
LR 0.000 -6.210 0.000*** 
Constant 0.670 36.460 0.000*** 
 
Wald χ2 (5) = 139.36 [p=0.000] 
* 0,0: 10 HH  H0 rejected at a 10% significance level 
** As above but reject H0  at a 5% significance level 
*** As above but reject H0  at a 1% significance level 
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Overall, the results from the independent estimation of the conflict and development 
equations confirm the hypotheses outlined above that financial instability and diversion of 
resources to military spending have direct, significant and positive impacts on the probability 
of civil conflict. In addition, confirming previous evidence as well as the hypotheses outlined 
above, the level of human development has a significant and negative association with the 
probability of conflict; conflict is less likely at higher levels of development. Development is 
affected by financial variables, with the results above showing that social expenditure has a 
positive and significant impact on human development and interest rates have a negative and 
significant impact. Overall this confirms that financial variables have an indirect impact on 
the probability of conflict, via their impact on development.  
The results from the 2SPLS estimation of the simultaneous system of equations 
(Table 2) broadly confirm the findings from the separate estimations suggesting that these 
findings are robust across estimation techniques. Whilst the lending rate is insignificant in 
both estimations, this will reflect multicollinearity because its influence is already captured 
within the fitted values of the conflict and development variables. 
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TABLE 2: MACROFINANCIAL MODEL SIMULTANEOUS ESTIMATION:  
2SPLS Second Stage Estimation Results (corrected standard errors) 
N= 572 (44 countries, 1995-2007)  
 
Dependent variable: HDI    
 Parameter  
 estimate t test p value   
W (fitted) 0.032 1.620 0.106   
GKF 0.002 2.430 0.015**   
LR 0.000 1.060 0.289   
POPG -0.068 -12.940 0.000***   
Constant 0.753 29.270 0.000***   
R-squared 0.334     
R-squared (adjusted) 0.329     
F test explanatory power F(4,566)=71.01 [p=0.000]   
 
Dependent variable: Conflict  
 Parameter  
 estimate z score p value   
HDI (fitted) -2.580 -3.240 0.001***   
LR 0.002 0.590 0.554   
MILEX 0.173 4.390 0.000***   
CBA -0.020 -0.020 0.981   
Constant 0.375 0.700 0.485   
Log likelihood -260.386     
Pseudo R
2
  0.060     
 LR test χ2 (4)=33.07 [p=0.000]   
* 0,0: 10 HH  H0 rejected at a 10% significance level 
** As above but reject H0  at a 5% significance level 
*** As above but reject H0  at a 1% significance level 
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The results from the “microfinancial” model, which incorporates financial 
infrastructure variables (though with a necessarily smaller sample as explained above) are 
outlined in Table 3. Unsurprisingly perhaps (given the smaller sample) the statistical power is 
lower for the microfinancial models, with fewer significant explanatory variables (and no 
significant explanatory variables for the conflict model). In addition, for the development 
model the population growth variable, whilst statistically insignificant, has a counterintuitive 
sign.  
The 2SPLS model is estimated in a restricted, as well as unrestricted, form (see Table 
4). The results from the 2SPLS estimation confirm (as identified above) not only that 
population growth and capital formation are significant determinants of development but also 
to show that financial infrastructure, as measured by the number of bank branches per capita 
has a significant impact on development. Given the fact that development is a significant 
determinant of conflict in the simultaneous model, this suggests that financial infrastructure 
has an indirect negative impact on conflict propensity because it boosts development, and 
development lowers conflict propensity.  
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TABLE 3: MICROFINANCIAL MODEL (SMALL SAMPLE) 
N=124 (31 countries, 2004-2007) 
 
3a Random effects probit estimation 
Dependent variable: Civil conflict (Y=1, N=0) 
 Parameter  
 estimate z score p value 
HDI -2.004 -0.480 0.634 
CBA 12.188 0.980 0.325 
LR -0.023 -0.370 0.712 
Constant -3.226 -1.060 0.291  
Wald χ2(df=3) = 0.98 [p=0.806]  
 
3b Random effects GLS estimation 
Dependent variable: HDI   
N=66 (17 countries, 2004-2007)   
  Parameter  
  estimate t test  p value 
W  0.008 1.890  0.059*  
SOCEXP  0.000 0.260  0.794  
GKF  0.000 0.350  0.725  
POPG  0.012 2.090  0.037**  
LR  -0.001 -2.250  0.024**  
BORROW  0.126 2.370  0.018**  
BRANCH  421.249 2.050  0.041**  
DEPOSIT  -0.015 -0.550  0.581  
ATM  9.263 0.480  0.631  
Constant  0.642 20.140 0.000***  
Wald χ2 (df=9) = 51.83 [p=0.000]   
 
* Statistically significant at a 10%,  ** at 5%,  *** at 1% significance level   
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TABLE 4: MICROFINANCIAL MODEL SIMULTANEOUS ESTIMATION 
2SPLS: Second Stage Estimation Results (corrected standard errors) 
N= 572 (44 countries, 1995-2007)  
 UNRESTRICTED RESTRICTED  
Dependent variable: HDI   
 Parameter   p Parameter   p 
 Estimate t test value estimate t test value 
W (fitted) -0.003 -0.010 0.994 -0.015 -1.40 0.165 
GKF 0.005 0.010 0.989 0.004 1.86 0.066* 
POPG -0.011 -0.010 0.994 -0.036 -3.35 0.001*** 
LR 0.004 0.020 0.986 ... ...  ... 
SOCEXP 0.016 0.010 0.995 ... ...  ... 
BORROW 0.202 0.010 0.990 ... ...  ... 
BRANCH 2912.4 0.050 0.958 1150.45 4.64 0.000*** 
DEPOSIT 0.175 0.010 0.990 ... ...  ... 
ATMs -421.8 -0.010 0.989 ... ...  ... 
Constant 0.374 0.040 0.971 0.533 9.03 0.000*** 
R-squared 0.708   0.56   
Adj R-squared 0.661   0.54   
F test of explanatory  
power:   F(9.56) = 15.06 [p=0.000] F(3,111) = 45.33 [p=0.000] 
Dependent variable: Conflict   
 Parameter    Parameter 
 estimate t test p value estimate t test p value 
HDI (fitted) -0.654 0.000 0.997 -4.079 -2.01 0.044** 
LR -0.024 -0.010 0.994 -0.070 -2.46 0.014** 
CBA -4.790 -0.010 0.994 ... ... ... 
Constant -0.021 0.000 1.000 2.573 1.93 0.054** 
Log likelihood -29.040  -42.0  
Pseudo R2 0.023  0.16  
Likelihood  χ2 (3) = 1.39  χ2 (2) = 14.47 
Ratio test [p=0.7069] [p=0.000]  
* Statistically significant at a 10%,  ** at 5%,  *** at 1% significance level   
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Whilst the results from the microfinancial model are less robust than those from the 
macrofinancial model, nonetheless they are consistent with the hypothesis that, by boosting 
development prospects, micro-level financial infrastructure has an impact in reducing the 
probability of civil conflict. Overall these estimations have confirmed the overriding 
hypothesis that financial factors increase the probability of conflict not only directly but also 
because financial variables have their impact on conflict via impacts on development. 
5. Conclusions 
Complex interactions between civil conflict and financial factors suggest that a 
number of feedback effects will operate to ensure that financial instability in conflict-prone 
underdeveloped countries creates further problems of poverty and underdevelopment.  Thus 
poverty and underdevelopment are the outcome of the vicious cycle between social and 
political unrest, armed conflict and financial instability. In this paper, the relationships 
between armed conflict, finance and inequality have been analysed and indicate that conflict, 
financial instability and poverty may feed into each other, reinforcing destabilising political, 
socio-economic and financial forces in underdeveloped countries. Whilst military institutions 
may bestow some benefits on developing economies, if their actions foster financial 
instability then this will have substantial ramifications for the macroeconomies of stagnant 
nations because feedback processes will retard/reverse the evolution of financial institutions, 
creating prolonged constraints on the availability of finance in developing economies. 
Designing effective financial policies to overcome conflict-finance-poverty traps may be 
problematic, for example because possibilities for currency reform may be limited partly 
because currencies are perceived as nationalistic symbols and partly because they are 
desirable as a source of seigniorage revenue. Given the fiscal deficits generated by ongoing 
conflict, the market for public debt becomes crucial but capital markets in post-conflict 
underdeveloped countries tend to be thin because of financial repression. For this reason, 
effective financial reform is critical to the effective resurrecting of domestic capital markets 
in post conflict stages.  If financial problems are severe enough to necessitate IMF 
involvement, then the financial stringency associated with IMF conditionality may put 
pressures on broadly based development: the poorest groups will suffer the most from fiscal 
and monetary tightening – particularly if elites are making military rather than social 
expenditure their first priority.  
In reducing the negative consequences of military interventions, particularly when 
these are precipitated by the actions of corrupt groups, the evolution of new financial 
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institutions within a democratic structure is important. Effective financial reform will be 
affected by political factors and governance: the regressive effects of conflict and corruption 
may be ameliorated in the presence of democratic institutions. But regardless of political 
systems, a crucial element in breaking the vicious cycles between poverty, conflict and 
financial instability lies in the effective regulation and supervision of financial systems, 
particularly in countries that have experienced repeated conflict. Even when conflicts are 
finally resolved, during post-conflict phases there will be pressing needs to rebuild domestic 
capital markets for reconstruction and if this financial reconstruction is constrained by 
institutional weaknesses and weak regulation then financial fragility will increase 
susceptibility to future conflicts. Financial reforms can ameliorate persistent conflict both 
directly and indirectly: macroeconomic strategies can moderate financial instability thereby 
directly lowering the chance of civil conflict; and microeconomic strategies can develop and 
deepen financial institutions and infrastructure, promoting growth and development and 
thereby reducing the pressures for persistent civil conflict. 
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APPENDIX 1: DATA CODES AND SOURCES 
Variable Data code Definition Source 
W W = 1 if 25 or more 
battle-related 
deaths in given 
year (internal, 
internationalized 
internal conflicts) 
Uppsala Conflict Database 
UCDP/PRIO (Gleditsch et al. 
2002) 
http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UC
DP/data_and_publications/dataset
s.htm 
d HDI Average of GDP 
p.c., literacy, life 
expectancy 
indicies 
UNDP Human Development 
Report,  
http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/indicators/74.
html 
 
finstab CBA Central bank 
assets as a % of 
GDP 
Financial Structure Database, 
Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt (2009), 
Beck et al. (2000). 
http://econ.worldbank.org/, 
Lending 
rate 
LR Lending rate IMF International Financial 
Statistics, from http://data.un.org/ 
gM MILEX  World Development Indicators 
2009, from 
http://data.un.org/ 
gS SOCEXP  World Development Indicators 
2009, from 
http://data.un.org/ 
K GKF  World Development Indicators 
2009, from 
http://data.un.org/  
pop POPG  World Development Indicators 
2009, from http://data.un.org/ 
f BORROW Commercial bank 
borrowers –as % 
of population  
IMF  Financial Access Survey 
(FAS) Downloaded from 
http://fas.imf.org/ 
f BRANCH No. of bank 
branches –as % of 
population 
IMF  Financial Access Survey 
(FAS) Downloaded from 
http://fas.imf.org/ 
F DEPOSIT Commercial bank 
depositors – as % 
of population) 
IMF  Financial Access Survey 
(FAS) Downloaded from 
http://fas.imf.org/ 
F ATM No. of authomatic 
teller machines 
(ATMs) – 
as % of population   
IMF  Financial Access Survey 
(FAS) Downloaded from 
http://fas.imf.org/ 
Population estimates used to convert FAS data 
into per capita terms 
UN Demographic Yearbook 
http://data.un.org/ 
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